In this paper we study competition between the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in FTSE 100 constituents. We find that despite the lack of price protection and integrated price feeds market participants often execute at the best price available, indicating that price competition is important for investors. In cases where participants do not execute at the best price, we find that liquidity is in general higher and that trades are more informative. When comparing the market quality across trading venues we find remarkable differences. The LSE posts better terms of trade and is in general more liquid than any MTF. But our results show that Chi-X, an MTF, contributes more to public information discovery than the LSE but that trades on the LSE carry more private information than on MTFs. This is consistent with the theory, presented in Nanda and Chowdry (1991), that more informed investors gravitate to the market with the highest liquidity. Finally, we find despite a high level of market fragmentation that the market for FTSE 100 constituents is relatively efficient. One concern to be addressed in later regulation is the lack of an integrated market tape, that is important to measure best execution and market quality and efficiency.
Introduction
Competition for order flow in FTSE 100 securities is fierce and increasing. Within the past two years the London Stock Exchange's share of on exchange order flow has fallen from nearly 100% to less than 70%. The situation is now such that regulators 4 are concerned about price formation in the stocks that make up the FTSE 100, which is the leading U.K. stock index. In this paper we study the competition for order flow in FTSE 100 securities and market quality, including price discovery and liquidity.
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) is designed to promote an integrated and harmonized EU financial regulation landscape. MiFID increased the competition by execution venues for order flow with the repeal of the concentration rule that stipulated the execution of retail orders on regulated-markets (RM). The concentration rule generally lead to a situation where a single stock exchange dominated in each member state. This situation was in contrast to the U.S. market where markets were more fragmented but virtually integrated via the consolidated tape and the consolidated quotation system. The lack of competition was rectified with the implementation of MiFID on November 1st, 2007, after which orders could be executed off the RM and on a multilateral trading facility (MTF) or systeminternalizers (SI).
The MiFID introduced a further innovation in European securities markets with its policy on best execution. Under MiFID best execution is multi-dimensional, in that price is not the only factor. The onus to define and enforce a best execution policy is placed on brokers, the results of which are unclear.
The best execution policy in U.S. securities markets is a best price policy, where the onus to enforce the policy is on the trading venue to which an order is routed. These differences can lead to competition on price or on other factors outlined in MiFID such as speed and probability of execution, or probability of settlement.
To study competition and market quality in FTSE 100 stocks we collect data on transactions and quotes for May, 2009 on the four largest trading venues in the U.K., the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. To study competition in FTSE 100 stocks we retrieve data from the Reuters DataScope Tick History data service operated by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) on behalf of Reuters.
We present some results on the determinants of fragmentation but this is not our primary focus. Rather we focus on the individual decisions of investors when routing order to trading venues. To better understand these decisions and to outline the resulting dynamics, we identify transactions that execute at the best price and those that do not execute at the best price. For each case we study factors that are expected to impact investor routing decisions. We select our observation period primarily due to the lack of major changes in the market during this period. Major market changes could confound our results as the market converges to a new equilibrium level of competition.
The main result of our analyses is that competition for order flow in FTSE 100 constituents is primarily, but not exclusively price-based. The quality of the markets under observation are varied. Surprisingly, the contribution to price discovery by Chi-X, the largest MTF is greater than for LSE. This adds fuel to the recent discussion surrounding the LSE TradElect system outage 5 . We also find that informed investors behave as expected and trade pre-dominantly on the LSE, the most liquid market in our sample.
Recently, communication technologies have revolutionized the organization of financial markets and the way financial assets are traded. Nearly all trading venues operate open and centralized limit order books which can be accessed by algorithmic traders and average investors alike. The connectivity between markets is also increasing, with the addition of standaridized trading communications protocols to improve communications and with the introduction of regulation, such as MiFID or U.S. Regulation NMS (Reg NMS), to integrate markets. Algorithmic traders have been shown to have positive effects on the price discovery process and therefore the integration of both equity Hendershott and Riordan (2009) and foreign exchange Chaboud et al. (2009) markets, and may be equaling out some of the negative side-effects of increased competition and fragmentation. This paper is closely related to other papers on market competition. study competition for order flow in U.S. stocks on electronic communication networks (ECN) and find that ECNs have a positive impact on market quality. In a recent working paper Hengelbrock and Theissen (2009) use an event study approach to examine the liquidity effects of the Turquoise market launch, and find a positive impact on liquidity. Bennett and Wei (2006) ; Mendelson (1987) study market quality and fragmentation and with inconclusive results. Taken in its entirety the evidence suggests that competition may be good for FTSE 100 stocks. How this competition plays out in the market and which market (s) survives is an open questions.
Methodologically this paper has a number of influences. As in Hasbrouck (1995) we assume that there is an efficient price per instrument across all trading venues. Supposing that arbitrageurs assure equal prices, this approach seems practical. To study the price discovery process we derive our method-5 see: LSE outage on November 26th, 2009. ology primarily from the analyses presented in Hasbrouck (1995 Hasbrouck ( , 1991a . Our study of investor routing decisions is borrowed from and Hendershott and Riordan (2009) 
The paper is organized as follows, Section 2 presents the institutional details and data used throughout the paper. In Section 3 we study the competition between the trading venues and present in-depth results on price and non-price competition. Section 4 presents results on market quality for each trading venue and in Section 5 we conclude.
Institutional Details and Data
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) has significantly changed the trading landscape in the European Union. MiFID became effective in Europe in November 2007 providing a common set of rules in order to create an integrated, competitive, and transparent European financial market. The definition of best execution under MiFID is multidimensional, that means, in contrast to the U.S. Regulation NMS (Reg NMS) there are more criteria and characteristics than the price. Under MiFID, investment firms are responsible for best execution of clients' orders. Their best execution policy has to incorporate additional dimensions like speed of execution, likelihood of execution, or probability of settlement.
Trading venues in Europe compete not only on the price but also on transaction costs, pre-and post-trade services, technology, and shareholders. In consequence, the best available price might by traded-through.
Our paper contributes to this phenomenon in two ways: First, we consider competition across trading venues based on the best price only and second, we analyze trade-throughs to proxy for non-price competition.
The traditional market model of primary exchanges was quickly challenged by new entrants like Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. The so-called multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) differentiate on technology, trading costs, and the quality of their service. Their market models are adapted to the needs of highfrequency traders by offering low-latency trading with high throughput rates. Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise are regulated by the British Financial Securities Association (FSA) under MiFID and passported to provide trading services within Europe. Chi-X started trading about six month ahead of MiFID at the end of March 2007. The full list of FTSE 100 constituents became available on Chi-X starting on July 13th, 2007. To date, Chi-X is owned by Instinet, a subsidiary of Nomura Holdings, and a number of international investment banks and broker houses. The market share in UK stocks increased from 8.8% in March 2008 to 14.9% while celebrating its second birthday in March 2009. 6 The market became even more 6 see http://www.chi-x.com/chi-x-press-releases/Chi-X-Europe-Second-Year-Anniversary.pdf. We select May 2009 as our period of analysis for a number of reasons. First, given that we want to study the effects of competition and regulation on market quality and trading behavior, selecting a period with a stable market structure is important. During May there were no meaningful changes to the markets' microstructures, fees, or trading systems. This allows a clean analysis of the current intensity of competition and market quality. In the following paragraphs we present the institutional details of all trading venues as of May 2009. However, we also outline important changes made over the following months until December 2009.
Competing MTFs offer different fee structures, network latencies, and levels of service. However, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise provide the same basic market model. They all operate an integrated anonymous limit order book which combines both visible and hidden liquidity. 8 Hidden limit orders are not visible to any investor. These order types add additional liquidity to the order book and minimize the adverse selection risk for informed investors. However, hidden orders have to meet the Large in Scale requirement of MiFID. 9 Priority of orders is enforced according to the displayed limit of the order, the transparency of an order (visible orders have priority over hidden orders), and the time. Besides displayed limit orders, market orders, and iceberg orders, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise offer pegged orders, that is, the trading price is determined by linking to a reference price like the European Best Bid and Offer (EBBO) over all markets. Pegged orders can also be hidden. To guarantee investors attractive prices, the matching of orders on all three trading venues is subject to a price check. However, the MTFs apply different tolerance levels. Generally speaking, an order will be rejected if it executes a certain percentage above the European best bid or below the European best offer. All trading venues operate continuous trading over the same trading hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:30 a.m. CET). There are no opening and closing auctions except 7 The LSE aggreed to merge its dark pool unit Baikal with Turquoise on December 21st, 2009 leaving LSE with 60% of the new company. The existing shareholders will own 40% of the new company. 8 In addition, all three trading venues operate dark order books. They use the pre-trade transparency waiver available to reference price systems under MiFID. As reference price the Primary Market Best Bid and Offer (PBBO) is used. While ChiDelta went live on May 25th, 2009, BATS started it separate dark pool on August 7th, 2009. However, we concentrate our analysis on the integrated order books as we have no access to the trade data of the dark pools. 9 Regulation exempts large in scale orders from the principle of pre-trade transparency. Article 20 of the MiFID Implementing Regulation states the details.
on Turquoise which runs an opening call auction. The tick size during our sample period was the same as on the primary market, the LSE. The LSE trades the FTSE 100 constituents on SETS which combines electronic order-driven trading with integrated liquidity provision by market makers. Today, LSE trading system TradElect allows roundtrip times of about 4 milliseconds. Market makers are obliged to add liquidity to the order book. They pay a certain fee but they benefit from a lower trading fees in the securities for which they are market makers.
According to LSE market markers are active in all FTSE 100 constituents. The LSE and the three MTFs adopted a maker/taker pricing model. 10 While an investor is charged at LSE between 0.75 bps to 0.45 bps for an aggressive order, that is, an incoming order which hits an order that has been placed in the order book, she receives a rebate of up to 0.40 bps for a passive order. A passive execution refers to the case where a limit order is executed which has been hit by an incoming order. The maker/taker fee category depends on the order volume traded each month. While the highest rebate is received above a monthly trading volume of 25 bnGBP, the minimum fee of 0.45 bps per trade is charged with a monthly trading volume above 30 bnGBP. However, there is a minimum fee of 25 pence per trade. Chi-X and BATS offer a maker/taker pricing scheme with a rebate of 0.20 bps and an order fee of 0.30 bps for an incoming order over our sample period. Turquoise had the cheapest fee for an aggressive order with 0.28 bps and a rebate of 0.20 to 0.24 bps per order. The enhanced rebate level on Turquoise was applied for members whose trading volume exceeded a specified threshold in the previous month.
MTFs offer several potential benefits to investors. First, all systems offer a similar speed of execution with an average round-trip time for an order of about 0.4 milliseconds. Thus, the latency on a MTF is ten times smaller than on SETS. In fast moving volatile markets MTFs offer investors a smaller execution risk. Trading on LSE the price might be different by the time an order reaches the market. Second, MTFs sometimes offer better prices due to hidden liquidity in the order book. Thus, trades may occur on an MTF inside the spread at a fraction above the best bid or below the best ask. However, on LSE market Table 1 here -The first and last fifteen minutes of the trading day are removed to avoid biases associated with the information processing and inventory management process due to the opening or closing of the markets.
The data spans the period between 8:15 a.m. and 16:15 p.m. local time. We use Reuters' qualifying code to further filter our data. Reported trades of opening, closing, and intraday auctions as well as reported crossing trades are deleted. Since we only have access to trades occurring on the primary market and MTFs, we concentrate our analysis on these venues only. These data do not include trades executed by systematic internalizers, dark pools, and other OTC executions venues.
Competition
Stocks listed on the LSE can be traded via a number of alternative trading venues as well as on the LSE.
Each has its own set of rules, clients, and technologies. These include rebates for supplying liquidity, lowlatency execution systems, and ownership. The ability to attract order-flow in FTSE 100 stocks is strongly dependent on innovation in market design at each trading venue and the ability of each venue to attract liquidity suppliers. These two factors relate more specifically to price competition (explicit and implicit trading costs) and non-price competition (market microstructure, execution speed, and regulation). In this section we study the competition between trading venues and investors' routing decisions when price appears to be the first-order factor, and when price appears to be only a second-order factor. MTFs lead in liquidity provision. We think that this is misleading and discuss these results in the following section. The sum of total depth at the best bid and ask is greater on the LSE but not considerably greater than depth posted on Chi-X. The trade size variable shows trades are larger on the LSE than on the MTFs and might be evidence of clientele effects that may play a role in order-routing decisions. The descriptive statistics indicate that the market dynamics are quite complex and worthy of further study.
Insert
How competitive are UK equity markets? This is essentially the same as asking; how fragmented is trading in UK equities? To answer this question we calculate fragmentation measures using trading volumes reported on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. We present average weekly trading volume in each of the four trading venues in Table 3 . As expected the LSE attracts the most trading volume in each of the four trading weeks in May. We see evidence of a continuing erosion of LSE market share in May when the LSE loses about 3.5% of their order flow despite a lack of market level competitive actions.
The primary beneficiary is BATS which, nearly doubles its share of trading volume from 2.89% to 4.35%, but remains well behind Chi-X, the largest MTF, which attracts 18.8% of total order flow in our sample.
Insert Table 3 here -In Table 4 we present data on the cross-sectional determinants of market fragmentation. In Panel A we report summary statistics on fragmentation determinants. The market shares for the LSE MS LS E and across the MTFs MS MT F s are calculated with the total trading volume on a daily basis per instrument.
We use market capitalization (MCAP) to capture effects relating to the size of a firm and institutional ownership, calculated as the natural logarithm in Pounds. We include two variables intraday realized volatility (RV avg ) and quoted spread (QS avg ), calculated as the daily average across markets, to take company specific volatility and liquidity conditions into account. We include two variables that capture the proportion of trades for which the LSE was alone at the best price (AtBestA LS E ) and for which an MTF was alone (AtBestA MT F ). We expect AtBestA LS E to be a strong positive determinant of LSE market share. We estimate one-way time fixed effects models with Arellano (1987) standard errors as follows:
Insert Table 4 here MTFs post strictly better prices than the LSE, investors seem to ignore these and route to the LSE. In the following two sections we take a more in-depth look into price and non-price competition.
Price Competition
Markets can compete for order-flow in numerous way. They can compete on explicit trading costs, implicit trading costs (effective spreads), infrastructure, and on trading and non-trading services. In this section we study implicit price competition, or rather the sensitivity of investors to implicit costs. The results on cross-sectional determinants show that investors are sensitive to implicit costs, or rather the cost of liquidity.
The most commonly accepted measure of the cost of liquidity is the effective spread. The effective spread is simply the difference between the transaction price and the quoted midpoint, normalized by the midpoint. We use the midpoint of the consolidated orderbook to capture the price dynamics across markets. Table 5 presents summary statistics for effective spreads across venues and market capitalization quartiles. We also present robust t-statistics that capture the difference in effective spreads for each MTF against LSE spreads. The effective spreads for MTFs are statistically significantly lower in almost every MCAP group. One would typically interpret this as evidence that liquidity is higher on MTFs than on the LSE. We interpret this as evidence that traders or investors require better terms of trade on MTFs before they route their orders. When combined with the data on trading volume for each venue this result makes sense. If an investor requires a much better price before routing to an MTF we would expect trading volume to be lower on the MTFs in general. Also we may interpret the differences in effective spreads as the preference for other services. Alternate explanations exist as these results may simply be driven by time-varying liquidity, time-of-day effects or other institutional details.
Insert Table 5 here -
The results on effective spreads seem to indicate that liquidity is better on MTFs than on the LSE. But this is not entirely the case. Effective spreads are conditional on execution and may have been considerably higher had all the transactions been executed on a single MTF. Given that the LSE provided liquidity to roughly 70% of all transaction an average effective spread of 4.6 bps is quite good. The results also demonstrates that price competition is not entirely perfect. Perfect price competition would lead to a situation where effective spreads are equivalent given execution conditions, such as volume and volatility.
To better understand price-competition dynamics between venues we compile statistics that capture executions where a market is at best and at best alone. Panel A of Table 6 reports results for at best and Panel B for at best alone. The market at best column presents the number of trades where a market was at best for an execution. The rows can be interpreted as probability vectors that sum to 100%. A clear result is that when the best price is posted on the LSE, they are the most likely to receive the transaction.
The results for Chi-X also indicate that investors route orders there when they are at the best with another market.
Insert Table 6 here -BATS and Turquoise are only able to improve the execution probability slightly when at best with another market. Panel B makes more clear the sensitivity of order flow to price. We see that about 95% of orderflow is routed to the LSE when they are at the best price alone. Chi-X is again quite competitive in their ability to attract order-flow with the best price with about 83% probability of attracting the order-flow when they are at best alone. Both BATS and Turquoise are able to dramatically increase the percentage of order-flow attracted when posting the best price, but remain well behind Chi-X and the LSE despite posting a strictly better price. This is evidence that investors condition routing decisions on price and non-price factors but are quite price sensitive nonetheless.
To provide a more in-depth analysis of the level of price-competition and insight into other potential competitive factors, highlighted in the MiFID best execution regulation, we estimate a multinomial logistical regression. We select the LSE as reference level to contrast executions on a MTF and on the primary market, the LSE. Positive coefficients indicate a tendency to execute on the listed MTF rather than on the LSE. The parameters of the following model are estimated by the method of maximum likelihood:
where j ∈ {ChiX, BAT S , T urquoise}. The first coefficient, QS Pdi f f is the most important in terms of price competition. It is calculated as the difference between the consolidated spread and the spread in the market where the execution occurs. The consolidated spread is the the difference between the maximum bid and the minimum ask across across all trading venues, normalized by the corresponding midpoint.
Insert Table 8 here -
The results in Table 8 show, as expected, that as liquidity conditions in one of the MTFs worsen, orderflow migrates to the LSE. This confirms the previous analysis that price is an important factor but that barring the best price, order flow migrates to the LSE. rDepth is calculated as the depth in the market with an execution relative to the total depth across all four trading venues. We find positive coefficients across MTFs. Turquoise order-flow is more sensitive to its own relative depth than are BATS and Chi-X.
The variables sVol, rv15, and Vol15 are used as control variables, to control for trade size, lagged 15-minute volatility, and lagged 15-minute trading volume in Euros. The variables show that larger trades conditionally tend to execute on the MTFs, that when lagged volume is high order-flow migrates to the LSE, and that when the realized volatility in the market is high, investors tend to trade on MTFs. This final result is perhaps due to the speed advantages provided by MTFs over the LSE. This evidence is inconclusive in that depending on which model we estimate (with MCAP or firm dummies). The results
for Chi-X indicate that flow may in fact revert to the LSE, or that there is in fact no difference. The buy and sell variable capture the relative tendencies of investors to trade in the same market in the same direction, perhaps indicating static routing decisions for larger orders.
The above analyses show that post-MiFID there is strong competition based on price. This was to be expected given the competitiveness in the provision of banking services. Financial intermediaries including, brokers, banks, and mutual fund companies compete for customers based primarily on the cost of their services. A large portion of this cost is the cost of trading. We see that when the LSE or Chi-X post the best price alone they are quite likely to attract the order, the same is not necessarily the case for BATS or Turquoise. We do see evidence that all MTFs are able to improve the probability of attracting an (market) order when the market spread relative to consolidated spread across trading venues improve,
i.e. as liquidity improves in a market orders migrate there. In the following section we study competition where price seems to play a second-order role in the routing decision.
Non-Price Competition
MiFID allows financial services firms to leeway in their definition of best execution. Rather than focus only on price firms can take into account execution speed, probability of execution and other factors. The previous analysis show that most routing decisions are made primarily on the basis of price. In this section
we present an analyses that captures routing dynamics when the best price is not the main criteria, i.e. the best available price across markets is traded-through. We quantify the potential savings to investors had they routed their orders to exchanges with the best prices whereas we assume that sufficient depth is available. This also includes potential savings by splitting a single order into smaller orders and routing to multiple venues.
In Panel A of Table 9 we examine trade-throughs. We present the number in terms of the absolute number of trade-throughs on a trade-by-trade basis and a function of total trading volume. We see that in volume terms trade-throughs are much more prevalent. The rows in each table indicate the beneficiary of the trade-through. By beneficiary we mean which market received the order despite posting worse prices.
Insert Table 9 here -The final column S avingsS um reports in kGBP the total potential savings by executing strictly at the best.
In terms of the number of trades, the most relevant for a trading venue, the LSE leads in attracting tradethroughs. The results are even more clear in terms of the volume of trade and total potential savings. The total market savings are roughly 37 million GBP on the LSE, 1.2 million GBP on Chi-X, and less than 200K for both BATS and Turquoise. This could lead to increased liquidity supply on the LSE, something we study in the following market quality section.
The results on trade-throughs should be taken as an indication rather than a definitive statistics. Errors due to uncertainty regarding ordering when aligning quotes and trades across the markets are sure to distort the results. However, these data are the same used by market participants when making their routing decisions and are subject to the same lags as for investors gathering the information individually.
To better understand the factors that lead to a trade-through we estimate a binomial logistical regression, similar to equation 2, using conditions in each market and in the consolidated market, on tradethroughs. Table 10 presents the results of the estimates.
Insert Table 10 here -For quoted spreads we present results using the spread the market of execution (QS Pmkt) and in the consolidated book (QS Pbest). While Depthmkt is the depth in the market of execution, we use the average depth across markets, Depthavg, in the second model. As expected we find that as liquidity increases and QS Pbest falls, trade-throughs become more likely. This is due to the fact that when spreads are tight the benefits to search for better terms of trade are likely to fall, therefore making trade-throughs more likely. The results on QS Pmkt are consistent with expectations and perhaps with the definition of trade-throughs. As the spread in a market increases, independent of the consolidated spread, the likelihood that a trade is not executed at the best increases by definition. We include these results as a robustness check for remaining variables. The results on depth suggest that as depth falls investors are less concerned with the best price, rather they may be more concerned with trading relatively large sizes. This is mirrored in the results on trade size (sVol), which has a positive coefficient in all specifications.
To capture the informedness of an investor submitting a trade we include a variable, priceImpact, that measures ex-post information. We make the assumption that an investor knows ex-ante that they are informed and that the ex-post measurement of information is a good proxy for this. The priceImpact is the difference between the midpoint of the consolidated book in t plus five minutes and the quoted midpoint in the market of execution, normalized by the midpoint. Consistent with intuition we find that this is positively related to trade-throughs. We would expect that informed investors are more likely to value speed over costs (up to a given point) when selecting a trading venue. The positive coefficient in both models indicates that this might be the case.
As in the previous models we include variables that capture market conditions. Trade-throughs are more likely when markets are more volatile and when lagged volume is particularly high. This may be explained by the fact that in more volatile markets investors may be more concerned with simply executing a trade, rather than also attaining the best price. The simple order-routing results in Table 8 also present evidence of higher volatility leading to investors to route to faster trading venues, i.e. the MTFs. By ignoring the best price in a market investors are essentially optimizing time to execution. The results for volume have a similar interpretation.
Market Quality
With the introduction of MiFID competition has undoubtedly increased. The larger number of trading venues has lead to a significant increase in the fragmentation of order-flow. Fragmentation has often been found to negatively impact market quality (e.g. Pagano (1989) ), particularly price discovery but also posted liquidity. However, Foucault and Menkveld (2008) find that increased competition among liquidity providers could lead to a deeper consolidated order book. Hengelbrock and Theissen (2009) provide evidence that the entrance of a new trading venue might reduce the liquidity suppliers' revenues in the primary market. In this section we study the contribution to price discovery and posted liquidity in the various trading venues.
Information by Trading Venue
To measure the contribution to price discovery of each market we first calculate the information share of each market. Hasbrouck (1995) developed this approach to determine in the case of distinct markets where the incorporation of new information takes place. The method assumes that an (unobservable) efficient price exists for each instrument. The approach relies on co-integration. While each individual price series is integrated, and therefore contains a random walk component, the price difference between two markets is covariance stationary. Due to arbitrage between the markets the price of a security will never deviate far from its price on another trading venue. The information share attributable to a market is defined as the proportion of information in the common efficient price of each to the innovation in the common efficient price. Hasbrouck (1995) defines the information share (IS) of the jth market as:
where j ∈ {LS E, ChiX, BAT S , T urquoise}. Ψ 2 j represents the contribution of market j to price discovery and ΨΩΨ is the variance of the random-walk component of security prices representing the total price discovery (information). As the contemporaneous midpoint of the different trading venues can be equal, there may be correlation between the midpoints and Ψ may not be diagonal. We follow Hasbrouck (1995) to determine upper and lower bounds that minimize or maximize the contribution of each market in the price discovery process. For a more detailed explanation see Appendix A.2.
Insert Table 11 here -The information shares are calculated on a daily basis per instrument and are presented in Table 11 . By construction the information shares sum to one. To compare the information contribution of each trading venue we compare the mean contribution ((IS upper + IS lower )/2) of each venue and present t-statistics using the LSE as a benchmark. Given that the LSE has roughly 70 % of the total trading volume and that it is the primary market we expect it to lead in price discovery. On the contrary, we find that Chi-X contributes more, at the 1% significance level, to price discovery than does the LSE. The mean difference is 9.6%. Even when comparing the LSE upper-bound and Chi-X lower-bound we find that Chi-X leads marginally in price discovery. However, there is a small tendancy that LSE's contribution to the price disovery process increases by market capitalization quartiles. We find that on BATS and Turquoise the contribution to price discovery is in line with their volume contribution. For a visualization of the price discovery process we present plots of the cummulative impulse response functions. The Figures 1 (a) through (d) show that an information shock on Chi-X has a larger impact on future prices, i.e. that Chi-X impounds more permanent information than the other venues. In addition, prices on the other trading venues are adjusted quickly to reflect the new information. The price adjustments to information shocks on BATS and Turquoise are significantly slower and their impact on future prices is less pronounced than on Chi-X and the LSE.
Insert Figure 1 here -To further study the information contribution of trading venues we perform analyses presented in Hasbrouck (1991a) and Hasbrouck (1991b) . We extend the typically used vector autoregressive (VAR) system to differentiate between different trading venues as in or similar for types of trades in Hendershott and Riordan (2009) . In the estimation we separate trades executed on LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. In contrast to Hasbrouck (1991a) and Hasbrouck (1991b) this VAR extension results in a five-way VAR model. The results of the VAR analysis are the average cumulative response functions for different trading venues over 10 trades estimated separately per instrument and day. The permanent price impact of a trade (Hasbrouck, 1991a ) is commonly used in price discovery research and is typically interpreted as representing the private information of investors. For a more in-depth description of the methodology herein see Appendix A.3.
The permanent price impact of each trading venue is presented in Table 12 . Here the results are different to the information shares analysis. We find that trades in the LSE carry more private information. This is consistent with the analysis presented in Chowdry and Nanda (1991) which states that informed traders will gravitate to the most liquid trading venue. Also consistent with theory and previous research we find that trades in smaller firms (MCAP quartile 4) carry more private information.
Insert Table 12 here -Using the VMA representation explained in the Appendix A.3, information can be decomposed into a trade-correlated part for each trading venue and quote-correlated portions (Hasbrouck, 1991b) . The results of the variance decomposition are presented in Table 13 .
Insert Table 13 here -This table shows the breakdown of information across trading venues and information types, i.e. trade and quote-correlated. We see that quote-correlated information, where Chi-X leads the LSE, makes up roughly 44% of total impounded information. Trade-correlated information on the LSE leads the MTFs and is statistically significantly greater in all MCAP quartiles. On the whole it seems that both the LSE and Chi-X contribute considerably to the price discovery process.
This makes clear the difficulties in assessing information and policy discussion surrounding price discovery in fragmented makes. If we take quote-correlated or public information as a best measure of information Chi-X leads. Using trade-correlated information suggests that the LSE leads. The current truth lies somewhere in the middle and is likely more complex than we can capture econometrically. The most important questions is what happens to market quality as fragmentation increases from this point, or when Chi-X or the LSE experiences an outage. We will further extend our analyses to examine this major question in the next version of our paper.
Conclusion
In this paper we study price and non-price competition and market quality across four trading venues in FTSE 100 constituents. The trading venues include the primary market, the LSE, and three MTFs, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. The results on price competition show that investors prefer MTFs when the bid-ask spread and depth on them increase. This is not surprising but important in that we find evidence that investors are conditioning their trading decisions on general liquidity factors. This is important because it provides evidence that when MTFs post the best price, either alone or with another market, they increase their likelihood of attracting an order. This competition should induce market innovation to attract more order flow.
The results on non-price competition are novel and show that as the information content of trades increase so does the likelihood of ignoring price considerations. This is likely due to investors desire to execute quickly rather than search for a better price on another exchange. The results also show that as the spread falls, and liquidity is therefore more plentiful, investors are more likely to ignore price considerations. This is an indication that when liquidity is high they trade-off search costs for liquidity.
Our results on market quality suggest that fragmentation of order flow does not harm the efficiency of the price discovery process. While the price impact of trades on the LSE is higher and thus, they carry by definition more private information, we find that Chi-X leads the quote-based price discovery. In sum our results point towards the positive impacts of competition, and MiFID, on competition and market quality.
A. Appendix: Computational Details

A.1. Liquidity Measures
In this section we provide detail as to the computation of our measures of liquidity. We adapt the Bessembinder (2003) spread calculation using the common Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to infer trade direction. Using Reuters DataScope Tick History data we calculate quoted spreads as proxy of trading costs for each trading venue separately. However quoted spreads only capture liquidity for relatively small trade sizes. All spread calculations presented below are spreads relative to the price of an instrument in basis points. Let Ask j i,t be the ask price for an instrument i at time t for j ∈ {LS E, ChiX, BAT S , T urquoise} and Bid j i,t the respective bid price. Mid j i,t denotes the mid quote, then the quoted half spread is calculated as follows:
Quoted Spread
,t * 2) Quoted spreads are calculated for every price or volume update and each trade during the trading day (Quoted Spread). As second measure we report quoted spreads on a trade-by-trade basis (Quoted Spread Trade). The effective spread is the spread that is actually paid when an incoming market order trades against a limit order. The effective spread also captures institutional features of a market like hidden liquidity or market depth. Let Price j i,t be the execution price on trading venue j then the effective spread is defined as:
Effective Spread
i,t denotes the trade direction with −1 for market sell and +1 for market buy orders. Mid i,t is the midpoint of the consolidated order book across the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. All liquidity measures are averaged on a daily basis per instrument.
A.2. Information Shares
Information shares are a relative measure to allocate information across markets (see Hasbrouck (1995) 
Then, m t is supposed to follow a random walk:
where u t follows a white noise process with E(u t ) = 0, E(u 2 t) = σ 2 u , and E(u t u s ) = 0 for t s. The moving average representation for the price vector ∆p t may be written using a VMA model:
where Ψ 0 is the identity matrix.
As shown, the observed prices can be decomposed into a random walk and a covariance-stationary error. The variance of the random walk component is then:
where Ω = Var( t ) and Ψ is a polynomial in the lag operator. The random walk variance reflects contributions from all four markets:
If the covariance matrix is diagonal (that is, when σ 2 i, j = 0) for i = j the contribution of each market to the price discovery process can be clearly identified. The relative size of these contributions indicates the importance of the markets. Hasbrouck (1995) defines the information share (IS) of the jth market as:
where j ∈ {LS E, ChiX, BAT S , T urquoise}. Ψ 2 j represents the contribution of market j to price discovery and ΨΩΨ is the variance of the random-walk component of security prices representing the total price discovery (information). As the contemporaneous midpoint of the different trading venues can be equal, there may be correlation between the midpoints. In consequence, Ψ is not diagonal. We follow Hasbrouck (1995) to determine upper and lower bounds that minimize or maximize the contribution of each market in the price discovery process. Information shares are calculated on a daily basis per instrument.
A.3. Trade and Quote Correlated Information
Following Hasbrouck (1991a,b) we separate changes in the efficient price into quote-and tradecorrelated components differentiating between trades executed on LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. This results in a five-way vector autoregressive (VAR) model. Let x Exchange t−i be the trade direction (-1 sell, 1 buy) for trades on LSE, Chi-X, BATS, or Turquoise, respectively, and 0 if the trade is not executed on the specific trading venue. r t−i denotes the quote midpoint changes in the consolidated order book. The full model is as follows:
The estimation is restarted for each trading day and instrument in the sample. Then, we invert the above VAR model to get the vector moving average (VMA) representation: Following Hasbrouck (1991b) , where L are polynomial lag operators, are used to obtain the cumulative impulse response functions (CIRF) for each of the four trading venues. The CIRF is the permanent price impact of a trade and is generally interpreted as the private information content of a trade. It represents the unexpected part of a trade, the trade innovation. Trades may contain information at lower frequencies than measured. This measure however has been used in a number of other studies with the same interpretation , Madhavan (2000) ).
Using the VMA representation from above, information can be decomposed into a trade-correlated part for each trading venue and quote-correlated portions (Hasbrouck, 1991b) . The variance decomposition is as follows:
The information content of quotes is the first term and the trade-correlated portions for LSE the second, for Chi-X the third, for BATS the fourth, and for Turquoise the fifth term. All lags are summed to get the total trade-correlated contribution of each market to price discovery. The results are reported in basis points for the CIRF and in percent for the information content of quotes. The observation period compromises all trading days from 1-May-2009 to 31-May-2009. We report sample and descriptive statistics for LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. All measures are calculated on a daily per instrument basis. We report the mean and the standard deviation in parentheses. Daily market capitalization for each instrument is retrieved from Bloomberg. All spread measures are reported as relative measures in basis points. While the quoted spread is calculated on a tick-by-tick basis per instrument, the quoted spread time is reported trade-by-trade. The effective spread is calculated using the consolidated midpoint of the best bid and ask over all markets. While the trade price is given in Pence, market capitalization, turnover, and half the depth at the best bid and ask are reported in Pounds.
C. Appendix: Tables
Sample Statistics
Market Table 4 : Determinants of Market Shares. The table presents the market share of LSE and the multilateral trading facilities (Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise) according to trading volume on a daily basis. RV avg is the average intraday realized volatility in basis points over all four trading venues. QS P avg is the average daily quoted spread. We retrieve daily market capitalization per instrument from Bloomberg. MCAP is the natural logarithm of daily market capitalization per instrument. AtBestA LS E stands for the percentage of trades executed on LSE in case of the best available price over all trading venues. AtBestA MT F s gives the percentage of trades executed on a MTF being the only market with the best available price. We run two seperate regressions using a time fixed effects model and robust standard errors Arellano (1987) regressing market shares on instrument and trading venue characteristics. a denotes significance at the 1% level, b at the 5% level, and c at the 10% level. to 31-May-2009. We report effective spreads in basis points on a daily instrument basis for LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. The effective spread is defined as the difference between the transaction price and the quoted midpoint, normalized by the midpoint. We use the consolidated best midpoint over all four trading venues. In addition, we test the difference between LSE and the multilateral trading facilities for signifiance using Thompson clustered standard errors. Results are shown for the entire sample and market capitalization quartiles. The difference of means between MCAP1 and MCAP4 is also tested for statistical significance. a denotes significance at the 1% level, b at the 5% level, and c at the 10% level. Table 6 : Market Price Quality.
We report absolute and relative frequencies for LSE, Chi-X, Bats, and Turquoise offering the best available price (AtBest) and the corresponding choice of trading venue. In addition, we report the corresponding statistics for the case that the best price is only available on one trading venue alone (AtBestAlone). The absolute numbers are reported in thousands. Hasbrouck (1991a) for LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. We report the mean and the standard deviation in parentheses. Results are shown for the entire sample and market capitalization quartiles. Using Thompson clustered standard errors we test for the difference in permant price impacts of each market relative to LSE. The difference of means between MCAP1
and MCAP4 is also tested for statistical significance. a denotes significance at the 1% level, b at the 5% level, and c at the 10% level. 
